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Economic growth in dual and mature
economies: revisiting the Pasinetti and
neo-Pasinetti theorems
Peter Skotty
March 16, 2022

Abstract
This paper (i) examines the role of income distribution in the determination of the average saving rate and the growth process in dual and
mature economies, and (ii) revisits the Pasinetti and neo-Pasinetti theorems. The pro…t share may in‡uence saving because of di¤erences in the
saving rates across households (the Pasinetti theorem) or because …rms
retain part of their earnings (the neo-Pasinetti theorem). The two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and the alignment between warranted
and natural growth rates in mature economies can happen through feedback e¤ects from employment to the distribution of income.
JEL: E12, E21, O41
Key words: Harrod’s problems, income distribution, saving rates, Cambridge equation

1

Introduction

The warranted growth rate, Roy Harrod argued, may di¤er from the natural
rate, and the warranted growth path is likely to be unstable. Many economists
thought that these dire predictions about obstacles to full-employment growth
were inconsistent with the stylized facts; there must, they argued, be mechanisms that reconcile the warranted and natural rates and prevent cumulative
divergence.
Solow’s theoretical solution to Harrod’s …rst problem – the reconciliation
of warranted and natural growth – allows the capital intensity to adjust appropriately. This argument is unconvincing. The Cambridge capital controversy demonstrated serious aggregation issues and undermined the notion that
This paper draws on Skott (2022, chapters 4 and 8).
of Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst and Aalborg University;
pskott@econs.umass.edu
y Department
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economies move along a smooth production function as the relative supplies
of capital and labor change. The capital controversy and its lessons have been
largely forgotten, however, and neoclassical production functions remain a staple
of most contemporary growth models. This state of a¤airs is all the more surprising since other mechanisms may explain how some –but not all –economies
experience full-employment growth.
This paper considers the e¤ects of income distribution on the warranted
growth rate in models with a Leontief production function. The average saving
rate is one of the determinants of the warranted growth rate, and the average saving rate depends on the share of pro…t. Thus, endogenous changes in
distribution may align the warranted with the natural rate.
The dependence of saving on income distribution may arise because of heterogeneity between households; households that receive a large proportion of
their income from pro…ts may save a larger proportion of their income than
households that receive mainly wage income. Pasinetti (1962) emphasized this
link. Alternatively, saving rates out of pro…ts may be high because …rms retain
some of their earnings, as argued by Kaldor (1996). The two explanations are
not mutually exclusive, but I shall consider them separately. The average saving
rate can also change for reasons that are unrelated to the distribution of income;
I shall return to this point in the conclusion.
Section 2 presents a brief outline of Harrod’s argument and three solutions
to Harrod’s …rst problem. Section 3 examines the household-based argument
for di¤erential saving rates and the Pasinetti theorem. Capitalists and workers
have di¤erent saving behavior but, unlike in Pasinetti’s original model, the saving rates are endogenous. Following Foley et al. (2019, chapter 17), workers are
life-cycle savers and leave no bequests, while capitalist dynasties optimize with
an in…nite horizon. Section 4 discusses a version of Kaldor’s ‘neo-Pasinetti theorem’which emphasizes the distinction between …rms and households. Section
5 concludes.

2
2.1

Warranted and natural growth rates
Harrod’s problems

Consider a closed, one-sector economy without a public sector. If the production
function is Leontief and and are the technical coe¢ cients, we have
Y = minf L; Kg

(1)

Using standard notation, Y; L and K denote output, employment and capital.
There are minor variations in the utilization rate of labor (labor hoarding)
over the cycle, and the utilization rate of capital exhibits substantial cyclical
‡uctuations. Firms, however, will adjust their investment decisions in response
to persistent deviations of the utilization rate from the rate that they consider
optimal. Thus, as a …rst approximation we may disregard labor hoarding and
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assume that capital is utilized at the desired rate in steady growth. Formally,
u=u
Y
K
Y
L

(2)

= u

(3)

=

(4)

where u is …rms’desired rate of utilization of capital. Equation (2) describes
the long-run investment function: in this extreme version of a Harrodian model
the accumulation rate is perfectly elastic at u = u . To simplify notation the
desired utilization rate is set to one and the technical coe¢ cients and are
taken to be constant. There is no technical change, and the natural growth rate
n is equal to the growth rate of the labor force N ,
^ =n
N

(5)

‘Hats’over a variable will be used to denote growth rates throughout this paper;
i.e. x
^ = (dx=dt)=x).
A linear saving function, an equilibrium condition for the goods market
and an accounting equation for the evolution of the capital stock complete the
Harrodian benchmark model:
S
I
_
K

= sY
= S
= I

(6)
(7)
(8)

K

where s and are the average saving rate and the rate of depreciation.
Equations (1)-(8) can be used to derive the warranted growth rate gw :
^=K
^ =s u
Y^ = L

= gw

(9)

This rate of growth is ‘warranted’because of the consistency between expecta^ = gw ; then the
tions and outcomes: if they invest (on average) at the rate K
investment decisions turn out to have been warranted in the sense that –taking
into account the multiplier e¤ects of investment on output – …rms on average
achieve the desired rate of utilization of capital.
This simple framework gives rise to two observations. If the natural rate
of growth n and the values of s and are exogenously given, …rst, there is no
reason to expect equality between the warranted and the natural rate. Only
by a ‡uke will it be possible for a pure capitalist economy to follow a steady
growth path with full employment. The warranted growth path, second, is likely
to be unstable. The actual utilization rate u is determined by the equilibrium
condition (7). If investment is predetermined in the short run, we have
u=

^+
K
s
3

(10)

The actual utilization rate in equation (10) is increasing in the accumulation rate
^ > gw : Faced with a shortage of
and exceeds the desired rate if for some reason K
^ however, aggravates
capital, …rms will tend to increase investment. A rise in K,
the problem: it causes the rate of utilization to increase further, implying that
the warranted path becomes unstable.1
The focus in this paper is on Harrod’s …rst problem. I shall assume throughout that the economy is on – or ‡uctuates around – the warranted path; this
outcome is consistent with the local instability of the warranted path (the second problem) if nonlinearities or policy interventions turn local instability into
bounded ‡uctuations.2

2.2

Three solutions

Dual economies Economies with employment rates that ‡uctuate around a
fairly high level would come up against labor constraints if aggregate demand
were to expand rapidly over periods lasting more than few years. Large-scale
immigration could alleviate the labor shortages but would meet political opposition, and it is limited how fast and to what extent new groups can be drawn
into the labor market (through changes in the retirement age, for instance).
This group of ‘mature’economies arguably include countries like the US, Japan
and Germany. Economies that could sustain high growth rates for prolonged
periods without running into general labor shortages are ‘dual’; most developing
countries fall into this category.
Harrod’s …rst problem does not arise in developing economies with a small
modern sector and large amounts of underemployment. In these economies
the modern sector can grow at the warranted rate without running into labor
constraints, even if the warranted rate exceeds the natural rate. In fact, it is
desirable to have the modern sector grow rapidly, thereby absorbing (open and
hidden) unemployment in traditional and informal sectors .
Solow While an elastic supply of labor to the modern sector ‘solves’Harrod’s
…rst problem for dual economies (or more accurately, implies that the problem
does not arise), a full-employment path represents a good approximation to the
long-run growth rate in mature economies. The equality between the warranted
and natural growth rates in these economies requires that
s u =n+
1A

(11)

simple formalization speci…es a linear adjustment equation for the accumulation rate

^
K:
^
dK
dt

=

(u

=

(

u )

^+
K
s

u )

2 E.g. Skott (1989, 2015, 2022), Chiarella et al. (2005), von Arnim and Barales (2015),
Fazzari et al. (2013), Ryoo and Skott (2017).
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The …ve terms in equation (11) cannot be determined independently; at least
one of them must be allowed to adjust.
Robert Solow singled out Harrod’s "crucial assumption that production takes
place under conditions of …xed proportions" (Solow 1956, p. 65), assuming
instead that the technical output-capital ratio adjusts.
Equation (11) can be used to determine the steady-growth value of the technical coe¢ cient . The existence of a solution is ensured if the range of possible
output capital ratios is su¢ ciently wide, but merely solving for
does not
establish that the economy will converge to this steady growth path. Solow examines this dynamic issue, but the analysis is conducted under very restrictive
conditions.
Harrod had set out to examine whether a pure market economy would be
likely to converge towards a steady growth path with full employment. Solow, by
contrast, addresses a more limited question. He assumes, that "full employment
is perpetually maintained" (p. 67) and that there is also "full employment of the
available stock of capital" (p. 68). Imposing these assumptions, he then shows
that it is possible to construct a logically consistent story in which both labor
and capital are fully employed at all times and in which, starting from arbitrary
initial values of the labor supply and the stock of capital, the trajectory of the
economy converges to a steady growth path with a constant output capital ratio.
Considering its ‡imsy foundations, the …ctional aggregate production function carries a very heavy load in Solow’s story. Product and process innovations
or shifts in the sectoral composition of output can a¤ect aggregate capital output ratios, and …rms may also change techniques in response to changes in
factor prices. But changes in capital intensity typically require new and di¤erent physical capital goods and –contrary to the assumptions embedded in the
neoclassical production function –the costly and slow transition to a new technique following a rise in interest rates may lead to lower capital intensity. Thus,
in light of the Cambridge capital controversy and the literature on aggregation,
models that rely heavily on the movements along a well-de…ned neoclassical production function should be avoided.3 Instead, a Leontief production function
represents a simple, neutral starting point in much the same way that linear
functions may be preferred as a benchmark speci…cation if there are no good
arguments for introducing nonlinearities.4
Kaldor/Marx Nicholas Kaldor presented his ‘Keynesian’explanation of growth
with (near-) employment in Kaldor (1955-56). Leaving problems of the trade
3 See Cohen and Harcourt (2003) and Felipe and Fisher (2003) for surveys of the capital
controversy and the aggregation literature.
4 Harrod himself recognized that in principle the equalization of warranted and natural
growth rates could be accomplished through changes in interest rates and their e¤ects on the
choice of technique. He explicitly rejected this possibility, however, suggesting that “the rate
of interest and the MARC [the minimum acceptable rate of return on capital] do not often
have a big e¤ect on the method chosen”and that an attempt to derive a rate of interest “which
brought the warranted growth rate into equality with the natural growth rate ... really makes
no sense” (Harrod, Economic Dynamics, Macmillan 1973, pp. 172-3).
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cycle "outside the scope of this paper", he assumed that the natural growth rate
"governs the growth rate" (p. 97).5
With a Leontief production function there are no marginal products to pin
down the distribution of income, leaving open the possibility that adjustments
in the share of pro…ts can serve to equalize the warranted and natural rates.6
Formally, if ! denotes the share of wages in income and the saving propensities
out of wages and pro…ts are sw and sp , the share of wages (!) must satisfy
[sw ! + sp (1
or
!=

!)] = n +

sp
(n + )
(sp sw )

(12)

This solution exists and is economically meaningful if (1 sp > n+ > sw 0).
Kaldor focuses on the steady growth path, o¤ering no discussion of investment decisions and of how the accumulation rate comes to be adjusted to the
natural rate. But suppose factor markets are competitive and that the gross
rate of return on capital (r) falls to zero if capital is in excess supply, while
real wages (w) fall to some minimum if labor is an excess supply. A standard
e¢ ciency-wage argument –whether based on nutrition or asymmetric information –suggests that the minimum wage level will be positive.7
Formally, let
w = wmin ; 0 wmin <
r = rmax = (1 wmin )
r=0
w = wmax =

g

g

if N

>

K

(13)

if N

<

K

(14)

These distributional assumptions imply that the average saving rate will be sw
if N < K and sp sw wmin = if N > K. It follows that
^
k^ = K

sw N
n= f

(sp

(n + ) < sw
sw wmin )

(n + ) if
(n + )

if

N< K
N >K

As long as sw < n + < (sp sw wmin ) ; the economy will converge to a steady
growth path with full employment and N = K; along this path the wage
share is given by (12) and the pro…t rate is
r=

n+
sp

sw
sw

5 Kaldor subsequently changed his interpretation of the stylized facts, suggesting that he
had been "wrong in thinking that ‘low-earnings’sectors have been eliminated" and that Britain
and other developed economies had reached maturity (Kaldor 1978, p. xx).
6 The analysis can be extended to cases with limited substitutability between ‘aggregate
capital’and labor.
7 The lower bound on the pro…t rate when N < K was set to zero to simplify notation.
It could be set, analogousely to wmin , at a value rmin R 0.
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Kaldor’s mature-economy solution has close a¢ nities with another, even
more in‡uential contribution. Using di¤erent terminology, Karl Marx discussed
the relation between the warranted and natural growth rates in chapter 25 of
Capital. Fast accumulation gradually reduces the ‘reserve army of labor’; a
decline in the reserve army strengthens workers and at some point the wage
share will start rising. As the pro…t share decreases, however, accumulation
falls, and low accumulation means that the reserve army gradually becomes
replenished.
Goodwin (1967) formalized Marx’s argument. Using the employment rate
e = L=N as an inverse indicator of the size of the reserve army of labor, he
assumed that the growth rate of the real wage is an increasing function of the
employment rate. If productivity grows at a constant rate, this assumption
translates into a positive relation between employment and the wage share,
!
^ = f (e);

f 0>0

(15)

Retaining the di¤erential saving rates out of wages and pro…ts and focusing on
the case where N > K = Y , we have8
S
= [sw ! + sp (1
K

!)]

Y
= s(!) ;
K

s0 < 0

(16)

Combining equations (7)-(8) and (16), the movements in the employment rate
are given by another di¤erential equation,
^ N
^
e^ = L
^ n
= K
= s(!)
(n + )

(17)

The 2D system de…ned by equations (15) and (17) has an economically
meaningful stationary solution with 0 < e < 1 and 0 < ! < 1 if f (0) < 0 <
f (1) and s(0) > (n + ) > s(1): The …rst condition stipulates that the wage
share must be falling when workers are very weak (if e ! 0) but rising when
they are strong (if e ! 1); the second condition requires that the accumulation
rate (the ratio of net saving to capital) be greater than the natural growth rate
if the wage share is zero, but smaller than the natural rate if the wage share
is one. Assuming the conditions are met, the stationary solution is given by
! = s 1 ( n+ ) and e = f 1 (0).
It can be shown that starting from any initial point, the Goodwin model
produces conservative ‡uctuations around the stationary solution. As in the
Kaldor solution, an endogenous distribution of income aligns the (long-run average of the) warranted rate with the natural rate. Unlike in the Kaldor version,
however, the model generates cycles, the balance of power between capital and
labor determines the changes in the wage share, and the stationarity condition
for the wage share pins down the solution the employment rate e ; an increase
8 Goodwin

set sp = 1 and sw = 0.
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in workers’power and militancy –an upward shift in the f function –reduces
the stationary solution for the employment rate.9

3

Pasinetti theorems

The Kaldor/Marx alignment of the warranted with the natural growth rate
relies on di¤erences between the saving rates out of pro…ts and wages. Pasinetti
(1962) pointed out what appeared to be a ‡aw in this argument. If workers
save, Pasinetti argued, they will receive pro…t income, and a distinction must
be made between the pro…ts going to capitalists (who have a high saving rate)
and the pro…ts going to workers (who have a low saving rate). The distribution
of capital between capitalists and workers now evolves endogenously, and the
average saving rate out of pro…ts becomes a weighted average of the two saving
rates, with the weights determined by the fraction of capital owned by workers;
the higher this fraction, the lower will be the di¤erence between the average
saving rates out of pro…ts and wages. This dependence seemingly jeopardized
the Kaldor/Marx analysis, but Pasinetti showed that as long as workers’saving
rate sw is relatively low, capitalists’share of total capital stock converges to a
strictly positive, stationary solution. Moreover, at the stationary solution the
economy will satisfy the ‘Cambridge equation’: g + = sc r. This ‘Pasinetti
theorem’ has been extended to cases in which the saving rates sc and sw are
determined endogenously.
In a series of contributions Tom Michl has analyzed long-run growth in
models with two classes, workers and capitalists. Both capitalists and workers
maximize utility and both may save. But capitalist dynasties optimize over an
in…nite horizon, while workers engage in life-cycle saving and leave no bequests.
The production function is Leontief and the economy may be either dual (with
a ‘conventional wage’and a perfectly elastic labor supply) or mature (with an
accumulation rate that is equal to the growth rate of the labor force in e¢ ciency
units). The model is used to analyze social security and public debt issues in
Michl (2007, 2013) and by Foley et al. (2019, chapter 17) to examine the
Pasinetti theorem.
9 It is not entirely clear from Marx’s own verbal argument whether the level or the change
of the share of wages is related to the size of the reserve army:

If the quantity of unpaid labour supplied by the working class, and accumulated
by the capitalist class, increases so rapidly that its conversion into capital requires an extraordinary addition of paid labour, then wages rise, and, all other
circumstances remaining equal, the unpaid labour diminishes in proportion. But
as soon as this diminution touches the point at which the surplus labour that
nourishes capital is no longer supplied in normal quantity, a reaction sets in: a
smaller part of revenue is capitalised, accumulation lags, and the movement of
rise in wages receives a check. The rise of wages therefore is con…ned within
limits that not only leave intact the foundations of the capitalistic system, but
also secure its reproduction on a progressive scale. (Marx 1967 [2001], p. 891)
If equation (15) is replaced by a relation between employment and the level of the wage
share, the resulting dynamics reduce to a single di¤erential equation, and the economy converges monotonically to a steady growth path with a constant employment rate.
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Using a discrete-time setting, Foley et al. assume that both capitalists and
workers have logarithmic per-period utility. Workers live for two periods, working in the …rst period and providing for retirement in the second period by
saving a part of their …rst-period wage income, as in Diamond (1965). The
slightly streamlined version in this section is set in continuous time, and the
OLG speci…cation is replaced by a general life-cycle speci…cation.
Formally, capitalists’s consumption is determined by
Z
max e t log cc dt
(18)
st:
= (r

k_ c

)k c

cc

All capitalists have the same utility function, and the optimization implies that
^c
K
C

c

= k^c = (r
)
X
c
c
=
k = K

(19)

s)wL + bK w
K
r) w (b
K

(21)

(20)

where C c and K c denote the capitalists’total consumption and capital, with cc
and k c as the corresponding values for single capitalist dynasties.
Workers’ consumption follows Ando and Modigliani’s (1963) speci…cation
of an aggregate consumption function derived from aggregating the consumption decisions of life-cycle optimizing households. The expressions for workers’
consumption and the growth rate of workers’wealth are10
Cw

=

^w
K

= s(

(1

(r

))

(22)

A continuous-time version of the 2-period OLG version in Foley et al. would
have b = 1 + r
.
As in the Kaldor model in section 2.2, factor prices are determined by equations (13)-(14). Thus, in a dual economy the growth rate of aggregate capital
can be written.
^ = (rmax
K

)

Kc
+ [s(
K

rmax )

K
Kw

(b

(rmax

))]

Kw
K

(23)

Combining equations (19) and (23), capitalists’share of capital follows that the
di¤erential equation
^c
K

^ = [b
K

s(

rmax )]

(b

)

Kc
K

1 0 Ando and Modigliano (1963) estimate coe¢ cients of about 0:6 and 0:06 for (1
s) and b
which, they suggest, is in line with what would be expected theoretically. Muellbauer (2010)
discusses more recent empitical models that use extended versions of the LCH, including the
Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model.
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This equation has a stable stationary solution with 0 < K c =K < 1 if 0 <
s(
rmax ) < b
:
Kc
s(
rmax )
!1
K
b
At the stationary solution we have
^ = rmax
K

(24)

Convergence to maturity is assured if the growth rate of the capital stock exceeds
the natural rate of growth (if rmax
> n).
^ = n;
Once maturity is reached, continued full employment requires that K
that is,
^
K

=

(r

=

(b

)
)

Kc
+ s(
K

Kc
+s
K

r)

b

(b

+ (1

(r

))

Kw
K

s)r = n

(25)

Equation (25) determines the pro…t rate r in a mature economy:
r=

n+ +b s
1 s

b
1

Kc
s K

Substituting this value of the pro…t rate into equation (19) and using (25), the
dynamics of wealth distribution is given by.
^c
K

^
K

= r
=

n

sn + s + b s
1 s

Hence, if 0 < s(
n
solution with 0 < K c =K < 1:

) < b

Kc
!1
K

(1

s)

c

(b
1

) KK
s

; we get convergence to a stationary

s(

n
b

)

The associated pro…t rate at the stationary solution is
r =n+ +

(26)

Equations (24) and (26) capture the Pasinetti theorem. For both dual and
mature economies there is convergence to a steady growth path with a direct
positive relation between the growth rate and the pro…t rate (assuming that the
inequality conditions are met). The relation is completely independent of the
parameters that describe the workers’saving behavior; an increase in capitalists’
discount rate (an increase in their ‘propensity to consume’), by contrast, raises
the rate of pro…t for any given rate of economic growth.
The original Pasinetti formulation assumed exogenous saving rates, and the
relationship took the form sc (r
) = g where sc is the saving rate out of
10

net pro…ts and g is the growth rate. The saving rates are endogenous in this
version, and capitalists’saving rate is an increasing function of the pro…t rate,
sc = (1 r ): Using this notation – with sc as a increasing function of r
rather than a constant parameter – equations (24) and (26) can be written in
Pasinetti’s original form sc (r
) = g:
The Cambridge equation shows that workers’ saving and the endogenous
determination of the fraction of capital owned by workers need not sever the
link between the functional distribution of income and the average saving rate.
Changes in the pro…t share still allow the equalization of warranted and natural
growth rates.

4
4.1

The neo-Pasinetti theorem
Firms and households

By assumption all capitalists maximize the same utility function and the parameters of this function enter directly into the Cambridge equation. In 19th
century capitalism capitalists owned and controlled the means of production,
while workers were poor and did little saving. Marx could argue, moreover,
that all capitalists save and invest because competition compels them to behave
in this way. The delineation of capitalists is less obvious today. In a corporate
economy ownership has been separated from the running of …rms, and competition among …rms does not enforce a uniform saving behavior across owners
of equity and other …nancial assets. Bequests have also become important for
groups that we may not want to categorize as capitalists.
Je¤ Bezos, Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg clearly belong to the group of
capitalist households but what about the Rockefellers, Gettys and Carnegies
that may now live o¤ inherited wealth? What about hedge fund managers or
CEOs who may run major corporations but whose wealth is signi…cantly less
than that of many households that exert no direct control over the means of
production? And should other members of the top 0.01 percent, including rock
stars, baseball players and surgeons, who are likely to leave large bequests, be
merged with life-cycle saving workers? It may seem churlish to ask concrete
questions like this of a model that is designed to analyze properties of capitalist
economies at a high level of abstraction. But the model de…nes two groups
of households, and it should be possible to outline general criteria for the delineation of the groups. One group leaves bequests while the other does not,
and in a corporate economy this criterion would seem to correlate more with a
rich-poor distinction than with a traditional Marxian emphasis on control over
the means of production. The aggregation of households into in…nite-horizon
optimizers and life-cycle savers may still provide a decent …rst approximation,
but a defense of this particular delineation based on Marxian ‘character masks’
becomes less compelling in a corporate economy.
Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) brought up related issues in their analysis
of the Pasinetti theorem when they questioned the "assumption of ‘permanent’
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classes of pure-pro…t and mixed-income receivers with given and unchanging
saving propensities" (p. 297). Kaldor (1966) responded to the critique in the
same issue of the Review of Economic Studies. The high saving propensity out
of pro…ts, he argued, was "something which attaches to the nature of business
income and not the wealth (or other peculiarities) of the individuals who own
property" (p. 310). His ‘neo-Pasinetti theorem’ – which does not require a
distinction between worker households and capitalist households – presented
the analysis behind this claim.11
It may appear that Kaldor’s argument can be made quite simply. In a closed
economy without public sector, households’‡ow of disposable income (Y D ) is
given by
YD =Y R
where R is retained earnings. If retained earnings are proportional to pro…ts
and households save a constant fraction s of their disposable income, aggregate
saving –the sum of household and corporate saving (S H and S F ) –is given by
S

= S H + S F = sY D + R
= [s + sf (1 s) ]Y

where is the pro…t share and sf denotes the share of retentions in pro…ts.
Thus, if the retention rate is given, it would seem that an increase in the pro…t
share must raise the average saving rate. But the simple proportionality between household saving and household disposable income can be questioned:
households may ‘pierce the corporate veil’and adjust their own saving rate out
of disposable income so as to o¤set changes in corporate saving.
Retained earnings can be used by the …rm to …nance investment, pay o¤
debt or buy back shares. These possible uses of retained earnings all raise
future pro…ts per share (net of interest payments) relative to what pro…ts would
have been otherwise, with greater reliance on internal …nance also reducing the
riskiness of the …rm’s shares. The increase in future pro…ts per share and the
reduced risk will tend to raise the value of the …rm’s shares. A household that
wants to maintain its consumption despite higher retentions and an unexpected
reduction in dividends now has two options.
One option is for the household to take out loans or reduce its holdings
of liquid assets in an amount corresponding to the reduction in its dividends.
This option, following Modigliani and Miller (1958), will be ‘undoing the …rm’s
retention policy’: households o¤set the fall in …rms’leverage by increasing their
own leverage. The option, however, may be barred by credit constraints. Unlike
the …rm, the household may not be able to obtain loans, at least not on the
same terms as the …rm, even if the value of its shares has increased.12
1 1 The name of the ‘theorem’ is misleading. Kaldor’s analysis also rebutted Pasinetti’s
original criticism of his saving function by showing there is no logical slip in assuming di¤erent
saving propensities out of wages and pro…ts.
1 2 Assuming ’full rationality’there are two main constraints on the validity of the ModiglianiMiller result: the possibility of …rm bankruptcy and the presence of credit constrained households (Stiglitz 1969).
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There are other reasons to disregard this option. Sophisticated real-world
households diversify their portfolio compositions. They may also adjust the
compositions towards less risky assets as they approach retirement age. And
they may change the portfolio compositions in response to major – real or
imagined –shifts in the riskiness and returns of di¤erent types of assets. But one
would expect households to focus on the factors that appear most important.
Assessments of the riskiness of and likely returns on tech shares, for instance,
will have to take into account the regulatory zeal of the EU, Chinese industrial
policies, and the likelihood of future pandemics, while climate change and its
e¤ects on government interventions and policies are crucial to the prospects of
not just the energy sector but a whole slew of industries, from airlines to real
estate in Florida. In this context di¤erences in retention policies across …rms
may in‡uence the relative weights of individual shares, but the in‡uence of the
…rms’average retention rate on the overall weight of equity in the portfolio is
likely to be far down the list of priorities, if it makes an appearance at all.
Empirical evidence supports the insensitivity of portfolio compositions to
changes in riskiness. The Swedish government introduced a de…ned contribution component of its social security system in 2000. Each retirement saver
could select among hundreds of mutual funds, allocating her retirement savings
between up to …ve funds. Analyzing detailed data on the choices made by the
entire population of 7,315,209 retirement savers in Sweden during the period
2000-2016, Cronqvist et al. (2018) show that ‘nudging’ had strong e¤ects on
the portfolio choices and that the e¤ects of nudging were highly persistent: "the
participants seem to have a ‘set it and forget it’mindset" (p. 154). Following a
change in regulation in 2010, the default fund, which had attracted a large proportion of savers and which had been entirely in equity, switched to having 50
percent leverage. Despite this large, sudden increase in the riskiness of the fund
almost no one switched away from the default fund. Cronqvist et al. conclude
that (p. 157) "[i]n outer space, an object that has been nudged will keep going
in that direction until it is nudged again. Retirement savers appear to resemble
such objects."
Overall, the behavioral evidence makes it implausible to assume that households respond to an increase in the average retention rate by taking out loans
and/or reducing their holding of bonds and bank deposits. A rejection of this
mechanism leaves households with a second option, however: a household may
respond to a rise in share prices by selling a fraction of its shares. Thus, if an
increase in retained pro…ts causes the share valuation of a company to go up
by the same amount, a household owning shares in the company can maintain
exactly the same consumption and wealth as if it had received the dividends
(rather than the capital gain): the household can ‘declare its own dividends’,
not by adjusting its own borrowing but by selling shares. This is the argument
addressed by Kaldor’s ‘neo-Pasinetti theorem’.
The intuition behind Kaldor’s counterargument is simple. The suggestion
that share prices will appreciate automatically in line with retained earnings
involves a fallacy of composition, Kaldor argued. It may be correct that the
share price of a single …rm (relative to the general level of share prices) responds
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positively to an increase in the …rm’s retained earnings. It is also correct that
an individual shareholder can declare her own dividends by selling some of her
shares. But households as a group cannot …nance consumption by selling shares:
there is no one to buy. Households’ attempt to compensate for compressed
dividends by selling o¤ equity leads to capital losses as equity prices fall. The
capital losses temper the desire to consume, and the average saving rate out of
income increases as a result of the rise in corporate retentions.

4.2

A formal model

Households in a corporate economy do not save in the form of physical capital.
Disregarding housing and other, less important real assets, household wealth is
…nancial wealth. Households may be the ultimate owners of the capital stock,
but the ownership of productive capital takes the form of equity.
Equity is not the only …nancial asset, and even as a …rst approximation it
is essential to include at least two types of …nancial assets: an asset with a
contractual rate of return and an asset, equity, that gives ownership rights to
…rms but promises no contractual rate of return.13 Thus, following Skott (1981,
1989) and Skott and Ryoo (2008), assume that household wealth consists of
equity and bank deposits (money).14
Firms …nance investment, dividends and interest payments on external debt
by a combination of pro…ts, share issues and new bank loans. The …nancial
constraint is given by
I + D + iM L =

+ v E_ + M_

where E and M L are the number of shares and the external debt (bank loans);
v; i; I; D and are the price of shares, the interest rate, investment, dividends,
and pro…ts; ‘dots’over a variable denote time derivatives, i.e. x_ = dx=dt). To
simplify the exposition, the price of output and the rate of interest i are taken
to be constant, and the price output is normalized to one.
If sf is the retention rate, the …nancial constraint can be rewritten
I=

D

iM L + v E_ + M_ L = sf

+ v E_ + M_ L

For given pro…ts and a given level of investment, …rms choose two of the three
…nancial variables. Suppose they set the retention rate sf (= 1 (D + iM L )= )
_ The …nancial constraint now pins down the required
and the rate of new issues E:
change in bank loans (external …nance).
In analogy with …rms’ …nancial constraint, households have a budget constraint. They receive wage income W and interest income (iM M ) on their bank
1 3 The formal model in the appendix to Kaldor (1966) had equity as the only …nancial
asset. This assumption implies that the household sector can only abstain from consuming all
distributed incomes to the extent that …rms issue new equity. In Kaldor’s setting, furthermore,
…rms cannot set investment, the retention rate and new equity issues independently.
1 4 The introduction of bonds as a second contractual-return asset would add little to the
analysis.

14

deposits (M ), while their holdings of equity yield a ‡ow of dividends (D). By
assumption …rms retain a fraction sf of their gross pro…ts , and the dividends
are given by D = (1 sf )
iM L : Households’‡ow of income is either added to
bank deposits or spent on consumption and the purchase of new shares. Thus,
we can write households’budget constraint as
W + (1

iM L + iM M = C + M_ + v E_ H

sf )

(27)

Neither …rms nor households hold cash (by assumption there are only two
assets, equity and bank deposits) and if, for simplicity, it is assumed that banks
hold no reserves and have neither costs nor pro…ts, we have i = iM and M L =
M:15 The number of shares owned by households must also be equal to the
number of shares issued by …rms (E H = E), with the price of shares adjusting
to ensure this equilibrium condition. Thus, the budget constraint simpli…es to
W + (1

sf )

= C + M_ + v E_

(28)

Using a traditional consumption function with non-property income and
wealth as the determinants of household consumption, let16
C = (1

s)(1

)Y + bA

(29)

where is the pro…t share and A = M + vE denotes household wealth. The
speci…cation is almost identical to the one in equation (21) but with one crucial
di¤erence: households’…nancial wealth takes the place of the capital stock.
If M denotes the share of deposits in household wealth, we have
M=

M A;

vE = (1

M )A

(30)

The stock of deposits is predetermined, while the endogenous determination of
the share price makes it possible to adjust the value of shareholdings instantaneously: the share price is given by v = M=E and the aggregate …nancial
vE
wealth can be written A = (1 + )M where = (1
M )= M = M .
Using equations (29)-(30) and dividing by Y , the consumption rate can now
be written
C
M
= (1 s)(1
) + b(1 + )
(31)
Y
Y
The short-run consumption rate in equation (31) depends inversely on the pro…t
share and positively on the ratio of equity to deposits (the portfolio parameter
) and the deposit-income ratio.
The changes in households’deposits can be found from the budget constraint
(28):
M_ = (1 sf )Y v E_ C
1 5 The analysis is substantively unchanged if banks make pro…ts (iD < iL ) and pay out
these pro…ts as dividends.
1 6 The speci…cation of household behavior in equations (28)-(30) endogenizes movements in
the stock-‡ow ratio A=Y . Using an alternative approach, Skott (1981, 1989) specify target
stock-‡ow ratios and derive the implied, endogenous saving decisions.
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or
(

M_
)
Y

=
=

c
M M
( ) = (1
Y Y

(1

sf )

^ + Y^ ) M
( E
Y

sf )

(1

s)(1

)

C
Y

^ + Y^ + b(1 + )] M
[ E
Y

(32)

The portfolio composition
may change, both endogenously in response to
changes in relative returns and as a result of exogenous shocks to ‘household
sentiment’. But as argued above, the Modigliani-Miller argument for compensating changes in response to shifts in average …nancial practices by …rms has
no behavioral support, and for present purposes the value of may be taken
as constant. If output and the number of shares grow at constant rates, and
^ + Y^ + b(1 + ) > 0; 17 the di¤erential equation (32) implies that the depositE
income ratio converges to stationary solution:
(1
M
!
Y

sf ) (1 s)(1
^ + Y^ + b(1 + )
E

)

=

s(1
) + (1 sf )
>0
^ + Y^ + b(1 + )
E

(33)

Plugging the stationary value into equation (31), we get
C
! (1
Y

s)(1

) + b(1 + )

s(1
) + (1 sf )
^ + Y^ + b(1 + )
E

(34)

Equation (34) implies that the inverse relation between the consumption rate
and the pro…t share carries over to the long run.18
1 7 The inequality condition holds trivially if
^ 0: The rate of new issues has
> 0; Y^ > 0; E
been negative in the US since 1980s, but the condition is satis…ed for plausible values of the
variables and parameters. Empirically, the ratio of buybacks to gross investment has been of
the order of 0.1 to 0.25 during this period, and with gross investment at about 15-20 percent
of gdp, we have vE
0:03Y: Output growth at 2-3 percent, a wealth-gdp ratio above 2, and
a consumption rate out of wealth of more than 3 percent, now imply that

^ + Y^ + b(1 + )
E

vE 1 A
A
+ Y^ + b
vE A M
M
Y A
A
0:03
+ Y^ + b
AM
M
A
0:015
+ 0:02
M
M

=

>
1 8 Using

the benchmark numbers in footnote 13, we have
C
@Y

@

=

(1

s)

b(1 + )

=

sf

(1

s

sf )

sf

(1

s

sf )

<

sf + (1

s

sf )

<

0 for sf >

s

1
2
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(sf (1 s))
^ + Y^ + b(1 + )
N
^ + Y^
N
^ + Y^ + b(1 + )
N
A
0:015 M
+ 0:02
A
0:015 M
+ 0:02

for all positive values of

A
M

The analysis has other interesting implications. Households’portfolio com^
position (the value of ) and …rms’…nancial behavior (the values of sf and E)
in‡uence the consumption rate: the consumption ratio is decreasing in sf and
^ and decreasing (increasing) in if E
^ > Y^ (is E
^ < Y^ ). Intuitively, houseE,
holds as a group can only spend disposable income on shares to the extent that
…rms issue new shares. Thus, the fraction of disposable household income that
goes into purchasing shares depends on both the rate at which …rms expand
the number of shares and the valuation of the shares. In the extreme case in
^ = 0) and households keep all their wealth in
which there are no new issues (E
shares ( ! 1); consumption must be equal to household disposable income
(C=Y = (1 sf )); attempts by households to buy shares merely lead to prices
being bid up until household wealth has reached a level that makes desired
consumption equal to disposable income.19

4.3

Feedback e¤ects on …rms

The analysis leading to (34) focused on household behavior, taking …rms’ investment and …nancial decisions as given. This partial analysis ignores potential
feedback e¤ects on …rms.
Undoubtedly …rms react to signals from …nancial markets as well as from
goods and labor markets, and households would be calling the tune if …rms
always made investment and …nancial decisions that fully re‡ected households’
preferences, information and expectations. But dynamic feedback e¤ects between households’ consumption and portfolio decisions and …rms’ investment
and …nancial decisions do not automatically solve the coordination problems
between households and …rms. The feedback e¤ects need not even produce
adjustments in the right direction.
Consider a simple scenario in which the share of investment that is …nanced
by retained earnings is subject to a …nancial norm. Speci…cally, let the …nancial
valuation of a single …rm (the …rm-level value of Tobin’s q) depend on deviations
of the …rm’s behavior from the norm and on the average value of Tobin’s q; …rms
that deviate from the norm receive a lower valuation than other comparable
…rms.
Formally, suppose that the valuation ratio for …rm i is determined by
qi = f (
where
f1 (

sf i i pi Yi
pKi Ii

sf i i pi Yi
pKi Ii

(zi ); q; zi )

(zi ); q; zi ) R 0 for

sf i i pi Yi
pKi Ii

(zi ) Q 0

C
Thus, the very weak condition sf > 0:5(1 s) is su¢ cient (but not necessary) for @ Y
=@ < 0:
1 9 Paradoxically, the long-run consumption rate can be decreasing in the consumption pa^ + Y^ < 0. An increase in the propensities to consume
rameters c and b : this happens if E
reduces the long-run wealth-income ratio, and if the reduction is su¢ ciently large, the net
e¤ect of a rise in a consumption parameter can be negative.
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Subscripts i indicate …rm-level variables. The average value of Tobin’s q is
denoted by q; qi is the …rm-level value of q; zi represents a vector of …rm-level
characteristics (size, industry, current pro…tability, future prospects, etc.) that
a¤ect the valuation. The prices of the …rm’s own output (pi ) and of the capital
goods that it uses (pKi ) may deviate from the average price level (which has been
normalized to one). The …nancial norm depends on legal and institutional
factors –the structure of taxation, for instance, or whether share buybacks are
permitted. Path-dependent Minskian views on prudent behavior are also likely
to play a signi…cant role, and the norm will almost certainly be contingent on
the …rm’s characteristics (zi ).
Now consider the e¤ects of a change in …nancial norms. Speci…cally, assume
that for some reason there has been a rise in the average value of : Firms
respond by raising their retention rates, the average saving rate increases, and
aggregate demand declines. On average, consequently, …rms experience a fall
in their output Yi or price pi : If investment is kept unchanged, each …rm has
an incentive to raise its retention rate further in order to satisfy the norm. But
as all …rms do so, the fall in aggregate demand is reinforced. And if the fall
in aggregate demand leads to a decline in investment, the problem is further
exacerbated. In short, the feedback e¤ects may not be stabilizing.
Empirically, beliefs that …rms’investment and …nance decisions re‡ect household preferences and that corporate saving is irrelevant for the average saving
rate face problems, too. The literature on the aggregate saving e¤ects of corporate retentions is sparse. There is evidence, however, that aggregate saving
depends on retained earnings. Poterba (1986, p. 503) …nds that
the most conservative estimates suggest that a one dollar shift in
corporate saving induces a 23 cent shift in private saving. For the
longer sample period, the implied e¤ects are much larger
In a more recent study, Bebczuk and Cavallo (2016, p, 2281) conclude that "a
$1 increase in business saving raises private saving by approximately $0.59". It
may be noted as well that the q theory of investment has not been particular
successful econometrically (e.g. Blanchard et al. 1993) and that Tobin’s q
does not hover around one (or some other constant) as one would expect if the
distinction between …nancial assets and physical capital were irrelevant (…gure
1).

5

Conclusion

Harrod’s …rst problem, the reconciliation of warranted and natural growth rates,
does not arise in dual economies. The two rates are aligned, however, in mature
economies, and this alignment calls for explanation.
The warranted rate of growth could in principle be adjusted to the natural
rate through changes in the capital intensity, as suggested by Solow. There are
reasons to be skeptical of this mechanism, however, and the adjustment can
happen in other ways. In order to examine (one of) these ways the technical
18

Figure 1: Tobin’s q

coe¢ cients of the production function and the natural rate of growth have been
taken as exogenously given and constant in this paper.
Empirical evidence as well as strong theoretical arguments support the dependence of the average saving rate on the share of pro…ts in income. The share
of pro…ts, in turn, may be in‡uenced by the employment rate which produces
a feedback from employment via income distribution to the average saving rate
and the warranted growth rate.
High employment rates translate into high (or rising) real wages and downward pressures on the pro…t share in a Marxian analysis, but although this
mechanism seems plausible, it can be questioned. Keynesian models reject a
direct determination of real wages in the labor market, which complicates the
chain of causation: the in‡uence of employment on income distribution must
be mediated by …rms’investment and output decisions and/or by an in‡uence
of employment rates in saving. High employment is associated with strong
workers, weak ‘discipline in the factories’(to use Kalecki’s term), shortages of
workers with appropriate skills, and high search and hiring costs. The business
climate su¤ers; …rms’employment, production and investment decisions will be
a¤ected, and derived e¤ects on aggregate demand puts downward pressure on
the pro…t share (Skott 1989, Skott and Zipperer 2012). The feedback from the
rate of employment to …rms’incentives to invest and expand output may be supplemented (or replaced) by a direct in‡uence on saving (as in Allain 2021).20 Or
extending the analysis to include a public sector, a policy of ‘functional …nance’
2 0 Kaldor (1955) eschewed these problems by assuming that capital wll be fully utilized,
with investment automatically adjusting to the saving.
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can be used to in‡uence the average saving rate and adjust the warranted rate
to the natural rate (Skott 2016).
Whichever form it takes, a negative feedback from employment to one of
more of the variables that de…ne the warranted rate constitutes the essential
element in any story about the adjustment of warranted to natural growth. If
the Solow story is rejected and is exogenous, this basically leaves the average saving rate as the accommodating variable with income distribution and
economic policy as the most important mediating mechanisms.
This conclusion, it should be noted, does not depend on the exogenous utilization rate u in equation (9). The exogenous u in (9) describes a long-run
property of a (simple version of a) Harrodian investment function: it is based
on the assumption that utilization rates above u would lead to ever-increasing
accumulation rates while rates below u would lead to decreasing accumulation
rates. Thus, the steady-growth investment function is vertical at u = u , and
the warranted rate can be found found by substituting u = u into the saving
function.
If this (extreme version of the) Harrodian investment is abandoned, the
steady-growth value of the utilization rate and the warranted growth rate will
depend on the speci…cation of both investment and saving. As an example, let
gd
g_

= a + bu
=
(g d g)

(35)
(36)

where g is the accumulation rate, g = I=K. A Harrodian version of (35)-(36) has
b > s ; a < 0 and > 0; a benchmark Kaleckian version sets = 0; a > 0 and
b < s . The Harrodian and Kaleckian versions di¤er with respect to the local
stability properties of the economy, but both speci…cations imply that in steady
growth we have a + bu = s u. The steady-growth value of utilization (u =
a=(s
b)) is determined endogenously by the parameters of the saving and
investment functions, but the reconciliation of warranted and natural growth
rate still requires feedback e¤ects from employment to the variables that de…ne
the warranted rate.
The analysis in this paper might seem to be at odds with empirical evidence
of increasing pro…t shares and declining growth rates in the US and many other
countries. The analysis does not, however, posit an invariant positive relation
between growth and pro…ts. Firms’ …nancial behavior has undergone signi…cant change; retention rates have fallen and high levels of share buybacks have
taken the place positive net new issues of equity. These changes unambiguously reduce the average saving rate in a corporate economy. Asset bubbles
and shifts in household portfolios towards equity (increases in ) work in the
^ < Y^ ; a condition that has been satis…ed since the 1980s.
same direction if E
Veblenian emulation e¤ects and a relaxation of credit constraints for low-income
households also a¤ected the aggregate saving rate. In addition to these e¤ects
on private saving, the average saving rate has been reduced by signi…cant …scal
de…cits; see Ryoo (2016, 2018) for a detailed analysis of the US case along these
lines. In short, the adjustment of warranted to natural growth can take place
20

via changes in the distribution of income –the topic of this paper. But saving
rates are also in‡uenced by other factors, some of them exogenous and others,
including economic policy, responsive to movements in employment.
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